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In June 2009, the World Health Organization declared that novel influenza A (nH1N1) had reached
pandemic status worldwide.  The response to the spread of this virus by the public and by the public
health community was immediate and widespread.  Among the responses included voluntary avoidance
of public spaces, closure of schools, the ubiquitous placement of hand sanitizer, and the use of face
masks in public places.  Existing forecasting models of the epidemic spread of nH1N1, used by public
health officials to aid in making many decisions including vaccination policy, ignore avoidance responses
in the formal modeling.  In this paper, we build a forecasting model of the nH1N1 epidemic that explicitly
accounts for avoidance behavior.  We use data from the U.S. summer and the Australian winter nH1N1
epidemic of 2009 to estimate the parameters of our model and forecast the course of the epidemic
in the U.S. in 2010.  We find that accounting for avoidance responses results in a better fitting forecasting
model.  We also find that in models with avoidance, the marginal return in terms of saved lives and
reduced infection rates of an early vaccination campaign are higher.
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1.  Introduction 
In June 2009, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared a worldwide novel influenza 
A (nH1N1) pandemic alert (World Health Organization (WHO) 2009). As of December 2009, 
officials at the Centers for Disease Control estimated nearly 10,000 deaths due to nH1N1 
infection between April and early December 2009 around the world (Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC) 2009; World Health Organization (WHO) 2009).   One unique feature of 
the novel influenza pandemic has been the widespread attention paid to it by the public.  In 
Mexico, the U.S. and other countries, early reports about the novel influenza led to closure of 
schools, cancellation of public sporting events, and countless individual behavioral decisions 
regarding the extent to go out in public, e.g., during a school-closure period (Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) 2009).  The decision to forego contact with other people is called 
an avoidance response. One implication of these sorts of public responses is that the illness 
attack rate and the reproduction rate (RR) of the virus (the number of secondary infected cases 
per primary infected case) are lower than them otherwise would be in the absence of an 
avoidance response.
1
Despite the importance of a public avoidance response on the illness attack rate and the RR of 
the virus, existing forecasting models of the novel influenza pandemic do not account for it 
(Boelle et al. 2009; Fraser et al. 2009; Yang et al. 2009).   
   
Economists have found avoidance response to be important in other infectious disease 
contexts, including seasonal influenza vaccination (Li et al. 2004; Yoo and Frick 2005; Yoo et al. 
2009) and measles vaccination (Philipson 1996).  Researchers have found that higher disease 
prevalence motivates people to undertake activities that subsequently reduce the extent of an 
                                                 
1 The RR plays a key role in models forecasting the extent of an epidemic.  For example, if RR<1 the outbreak will 
eventually die out.    
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epidemic.  The logic runs in the opposite direction as well—a decreasing disease prevalence may 
lead to a reduction in preventive behaviors that makes it difficult to eradicate a preventable 
infectious disease even if an effective vaccine is available (Philipson 2000).  
Our aim here is to develop a better forecasting model for the nH1N1 pandemic path from 
April 2009 to September 2010 by incorporating this concept of avoidance response, in 
comparison with models that do not include this concept. A secondary aim is to forecast the 
benefit of vaccination programs (available from October 2010) in changing the U.S. nH1N1 
pandemic path, as well as its final size, using the most recently available information about the 
pandemic, e.g., the past winter pandemic in Australia, and the newly developed nH1N1 vaccines.  
 
2.  A Model of Avoidance  
The main tool we use in our analysis is a three-compartment differential equation model, 
known in epidemiology as a “susceptible-infected-recovered” (SIR) model (Rvachev and 
Longini 1985).  In this model, people transition between three mutually exclusive health states—
susceptible to nH1N1 influenza, infected, and recovered (and hence immune).  Let Nt be the total 
population in a given state as of July 1, 2008 (US Census Bureau)—we conduct a separate 
estimation for each state in the U.S.  Nt is the sum of four terms: St (the number of susceptible 
people), It (the number of infected people), Rt (the number of recovered, and hence immune, 
people), and total deaths.
2
(1)  
  The model these compartments follow the following equations of 








                                                 
2 For simplicity, we assume   is constant for all t.  This is a reasonable assumption because the population size of 
each state is orders of magnitude larger than the number of people infected with nH1N1.  
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The three parameters α, βt, and γ denote the case fatality rate, the attack rate and the recovery 
rate, respectively. The first term of  
dt
dIt  represents newly infected people moving from 
compartment S to I at time t;  t I γ  represents those who recover from nH1N1 infection and hence 
mover from compartment I  to R at time t; and finally,  t I α  represents those who die from 
infection at time t. 
The standard SIR-model assumes that the illness attack rate, which is the rate at which 
susceptible become infected, depends upon two factors.  The first is the rate of transmission from 
a single contact between an infected and susceptible individual.  The second is the frequency of 
such contact among individuals, which varies across people of different age, family size, and 
other factors (Coulombier and Giesecke 2009). 
We modify this standard model to incorporate avoidance response—that is, the idea that the 
frequency of contact among individuals will itself depend on the prevalence of the disease in the 
population.  Unlike the standard SIR-model, in our model the attack rate changes over time as 
disease prevalence changes.  We assume attack rate to be the product of three factors: a constant 
baseline attack rate that represents a “biological” transmission rate; a baseline contact frequency 
which differs among subgroups; and avoidance response parameters which are influenced by the 
prevalence rate of the disease.  Because the attack rate in our model changes over time, so does 
the reproductive rate of the virus.  The appendix section provides more details.  There, we also  
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describe how we estimate the parameters of the model and how we modify the model to account 
for vaccination against nH1N1 infection. 
  
3.  Methods 
Our empirical analysis consists of three steps.  First, we specify and estimate a model of the 
nH1N1 flu epidemic along the lines of the model described in the previous section.  The 
Appendix provides details on our primary data source—laboratory confirmed daily reports on 
nH1N1 cases—and on our estimation procedure.  We estimate versions of the model that account 
for avoidance behavior as well as versions of the model that do not.  We also estimate separate 
versions of the model using data from Australia.  Second, we use our models to forecast the 
baseline U.S. pandemic path (without vaccination) between April 2009 to September 2010. Our 
preferred forecast accounts for avoidance response.  In these forecasts, we assume that severity 
of the epidemic mimics the severity experienced in Australia between May 2009 and September 
2009 during its winter flu season.  Finally, we characterize the benefit of vaccination programs 
(available since October 2010) in changing the U.S. H1N1 pandemic path. 
 
3.1  Testing validity of avoidance response model 
Our primary data sources consist of daily counts of laboratory confirmed reports from the U.S. 
(at the state level) between April 23, 2009 to July 17, 2009 (Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) 2009) and from Australia between May 9, 2009 to September 18, 2009 (also 
at the state and province—hereafter jurisdiction—level) (Australian Government Department of 
Health and Ageing 2009).  These cases represent only a small fraction of all nH1N1 cases as the 
vast majority of H1N1 cases are not laboratory confirmed.  In our models we assume a case  
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detection rate of 5%; that is, the CDC’s report of over 40,000 laboratory confirmed cases over 
the observation period implies that there were 1 million infected cases in the U.S. (Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 2009).   This assumption is consistent with CDC 
guidelines as well as U.S. experience during previous flu epidemics.   We estimate versions of 
this model in which we assume values of up to 10% for the case detection rate.   
Our model also requires information on how long each infection lasted, which is not 
available in the CDC data.  Based on data from previous flu epidemics, we assume a distribution 
of infection length with a mean of 4.1 days.  For each case in the CDC data, we draw a random 
infection length from this distribution.  We then aggregate over individual cases back to the day 
and state level to derive a panel of nH1N1cases for each state in the U.S. over 86 days.  We 
derive, using similar methods, a similar secondary dataset for Australia.   
We assume that fatality rate among nH1N1 cases was 1% with a range of 0.5%-1.2%.  We 
base this assumption on the observed confirmed-case fatality rate in the U.S. and Australia 
(Australian Government Department of Health and Ageing 2009; Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC) 2009) and a recent study (President's Council of Advisors on Science and 
Technology 2009). 
We estimate several different versions of our SIR model using a generalized least estimator.  
As we have said, we estimate a version of the model that permits an avoidance response.  In 
addition, we estimate a version of our model in which we impose that there be no avoidance 
response.  Our purpose is to compare the predictions of these two versions of the model against 
the actual path of the epidemic after September 2009.  For both of these versions, we conduct 
obtain separate estimates for two groups of states with higher and lower epidemic levels.  The 
higher epidemic level group includes the ten states— California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois,  
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Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wisconsin—that had at least 
1,000 confirmed cases per state.  Together these states consist of 70% of the national confirmed 
cases in total as of July 3, 2009 (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 2009).   We 
also estimate a separate version of the model with the Australian data.   
Since the infection length is randomly drawn in the underlying data, we conduct 200 
iterations of our estimation procedure.  In each iteration, we draw a new infection length 
realization for the entire data set.  Using the panel dataset produced in each iteration of the 
microsimulation model, we generate 200 different estimates of the parameters of our SIR model, 
once for each iteration.    
 
3.2  Forecasting the baseline U.S. pandemic path without vaccination   
Using our SIR model and the parameters derived from the estimation procedure, we calculate a 
predicted path of the U.S. pandemic between April 23, 2009 and July 17, 2009.  We compare 
these predictions against the actual path of the epidemic over that period.  We similarly calculate 
a predicted path of the Australian epidemic between May 9, 2009 and September 18, 2009 and 
compare against the actual path.  Since the vaccine against nH1N1 was not available at all during 
this time, the estimates we produce in this section ignore any possible benefit from a vaccine in 
reducing the spread of infection. 
We use our model to forecast the path of the U.S. epidemic after September 1, 2009, which 
we call the “U.S. winter.”  In these forecasts, we use the illness severity parameters from the 
Australian version of the SIR model.  There are at least two reasons why using the Australian 
winter pandemic parameters to forecast the U.S. winter pandemic is justified.  First, the 
reproduction rate of the flu virus, including nH1N1 varies with the ambient temperature, and is  
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higher in the winter than it is in the summer.  Thus, the Australian experience during the winter 
provides a better guide for the U.S. winter than does the U.S. summer experience.  Second, the 
Australian population is among all nations in the Southern Hemisphere, most similar to the U.S. 
in terms of its health status and social-demographic characteristics at the national level.  In 
addition, the information released to the general public about the pandemic in both countries by 
their respective governments and by the mass media is similar.  The average of the mortality rate 
due to pneumonia and influenza in the past three years, prior to the nH1N1 pandemic, was 
similar: 0.020% in the U.S. (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)), and 0.013% in 
Australia (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2009; Australian Bureau of Statistics 2009). 
 
3.3  Characterizing the benefits of nH1N1 vaccination 
Our analysis up to now has been predicated on the assumption that there is no effective vaccine 
available against nH1N1 infection.  As an extension to our work, we modify our procedure to 
take account of the fact that a vaccine did actually become available in the U.S. in October, 2009.  
The details of this modification to our SIR model to account for vaccination are described in 
detail in the Appendix.  Our modified SIR model reflects the most recent information available 
to us at the time of our writing:  in October 1-7 there were 1 million doses per day of the vaccine, 
in October 8-14,  6 million doses per day, in October 15- December 2, 3 million doses per day.  
In total, there were 196 million doses available (McNeil 2009; McNeil 2009).   
In this version of our model, we assume that the vaccine uptake rate ranges between 50% and 
90%.  At 50%, we effectively assume that everyday 0.5 million doses (out of 1 million doses 
available) were delivered and effective, and that the remaining 0.5 million doses were left unused 
by the end of a simulation period.  For simplicity and because there are no on-point data  
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currently available, we assumed vaccine doses to be distributed equally across the all U.S. 
subpopulations.  A 50% uptake rate is plausible because often a large number of doses remain 
unused even during past usual influenza seasons with vaccine supply problems (Orenstein and 
Schaffner 2008). 
 
4.  Results 
4.1.  Testing the validity of avoidance response models 
Figure 1 plots the cumulative path of confirmed nH1N1 infected cases in the U.S. between 
April 23 and July 17, 2009 as represented in the CDC data and assuming a 5% case detection 
rate.  Figure 1 also shows the epidemic paths forecasted by our primary model (solid line) 
accounting for avoidance response between April 23 and August 31, 2009.  It also plots the 2.5 
and 97.5 percentile paths (based on case rates on the last day) among 200 iterations of that model, 
indicated by dotted lines.  Both models produce estimates with a narrow interval between the 2.5 
and 97.5 percentile paths.  Finally, Figure 1 plots the epidemic path implied by the version of the 
model in which there is no avoidance response.  Evidently, not accounting for the avoidance 
response models produces a predicted epidemic path that does a poor job of fitting the actual data 
on cumulative infected cases over the observed period.   
 
4.2.  Forecasting the baseline U.S. pandemic path without vaccination 
Figure 2 indicates our forecasts of the the path of the nH1N1 pandemic in the U.S. up to 
September 2010 (extending the time period shown in Figure 1) in the absence of a vaccination 
campaign.  We plot three different forecasts.  The first assumes that there is no avoidance 
response, while the second and third forecasts incorporate an avoidance response.  The second  
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model is exactly the one we described in section 4.1 above.  The third model incorporates a 
renewed upsurge in nH1N1 infections in the fall of 2009, using the “winter” parameters derived 
from the Australian data microsimulation.    
The model which assumes no avoidance response predicts that the epidemic should have died 
out completely by August 31, 2009 with 61.1% of the population infected at some point during 
the pandemic. The second model, which incorporates avoidance response forecasts that the 
epidemic will continue throughout the simulation period of 500 days, with about 46.2% of the 
population infected by September 2010.  In this avoidance response model, the reproduction rate 
(RR) of the virus fluctuates around 1.1 in the 10 states with high incidence rate and around 0.9 in 
the 40 states with low incidence.   
In third model we use to forecast the pandemic path , the two key factors are the onset timing 
of the second epidemic upsurge and the severity of “winter” parameters derived from the 
Australian data microsimulation.  In this Australian microsimulation model, we found a median 
illness attack rates that ranged between 0.23 and 0.74 (with an average rate of 0.68) among eight 
jurisdictions.  Our baseline forecasts assume an attack rate of 0.68 to forecast a U.S. winter 
epidemic.  In our forecasts, on the first onset day of the second epidemic upsurge, we replaced 
the measured attack rate in each U.S. state with the Australian number.  Prior to the onset of the 
second upsurge (either September 1 or October 1), the mean illness attack rates was 0.29 in the 
highest incidence states and 0.22 in the lowest incidence states.  This model (also shown in 
Figure 2) forecasts that the epidemic will die out in January 2010 with 40% of the population 
ultimately infected.  
The forecasts of the baseline U.S. pandemic path from April 23, 2009 to September 5, 2010 
are summarized under seven alternative scenarios in Tables 1 and 2.  Table 1 shows the  
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proportion of the population ultimately infected, total deaths from the epidemic, and the effect of 
a vaccination campaign on these measures.  Table 2 shows the forecasted peak pandemic 
prevalence rate and the peak date, as well as the effect of a vaccination campaign on these 
measures.  The seven scenarios differ with regard to assumptions about the presence and timing 
of a second epidemic upsurge (indicated in column 1) and about whether there is a vaccination 
campaign.  In all seven scenarios we assume there is an avoidance response.  In column 2, we 
indicate our assumption about whether a vaccination campaign takes place, as well as our 
assumption about vaccine effectiveness in those scenarios where there is a campaign. Column 3 
shows our assumption about the vaccination uptake rate (either 50% or 90%) if there is a 
campaign.   Columns 4 and 5 in Table 1 show forecasted total pandemic impacts measured by 
the cumulative infected population over the course of the epidemic and total deaths, while 
columns 4-5 in Table 2 indicate the forecasted pandemic peak measured by the prevalence rate 
and the peak date.  Columns 6 and 7 in each table show the forecasted effect of vaccination on 
epidemic paths and impacts.    
Our models with avoidance response have the following bottom line implication for the path 
of the epidemic in the U.S. (shown in Table 1).  If there is a second upsurge, we forecast that 
between 33.9% and 57.7% of the population will ultimately be infected.  Without a second 
upsurge (scenario 7), we forecast 46.2% will ultimately be infected.  We forecast that the peak of 
the upsurge occurs within three weeks of onset with a maximum prevalence ranging between 
5.5% and 7.5% if the second upsurge occurs (Table 2).  Without a second upsurge, we forecast a 
peak to occur as late as mid-February with a much lower maximum prevalence rate of 1%. 
 
4.3.  Forecasting the benefits of a vaccination campaign in the U.S.  
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Since there is an effective vaccine for nH1N1 infection which has been developed (Hancock 
et al. 2009) and widely distributed despite early shortages (McNeil 2009; McNeil 2009), it is 
important to account for it in our forecasts.  Figure 3 presents our estimates that take this 
vaccination campaign into account.  Our worst case scenarios assume that the vaccine is 50% 
vaccine effective and that 50% of the population ultimately uptake the vaccine.  Our forecasts 
when the vaccine is available are sensitive to the timing of the second surge in nH1N1 infections.  
A delayed second upsurge (particularly the October onset) leads to a lower proportion of the 
population ultimately infected because the immune protection conferred by the vaccine (which 
typically takes up to 9 days) has more time to take hold.  For instance, if there is a second 
upsurge, we forecast that 57.2% of the population will ultimately be infected if the second surge 
starts in September, 36.3% if the surge starts in October (also in columns 4 in Table 1).  Our 
conservative scenarios with the vaccine predict and a 1% confirmed-case fatality rate imply that 
there will be between 55,100 and 86,900 total deaths in the U.S. due to nH1N1 infection.  
Figures 5 and 6 present the four scenarios (from the 7 scenarios presented in Tables 1 and 2) 
that we believe are most likely to occur.
3
Figure 4 indicates the forecasted benefits from vaccination in terms of reductions in 
proportion of the population ultimately infected.  Increasing the vaccination uptake rate from 
50% to the maximum 90%  (of the 196 million doses available) reduces the final size of the 
epidemic from 57.2% to 56.8% of the population in the scenarios with an September onset of the 
  .  In two scenarios we assume a second upsurge 
starting on September 1, 2009, and in the other two scenarios we assume a second upsurge 
starting on October 1, 2009.  All four scenarios assume 50% vaccination effectiveness. These 
correspond to scenarios 3-7 in Tables 1 and 2.  
                                                 
3  The reasons for choosing these scenarios are detailed in the Discussion section.  
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second upsurge, and from 36.3% to 33.9% in those scenarios with the October onset second 
upsurge (also in Columns 4 and 6 in Table 1).  
Figure 5 shows the benefit of the vaccination campaign in terms of reducing the peak levels 
of the epidemic.  We plot the same four scenarios that we plot in Figure 4.  If a second upsurge 
begins on October 1, a vaccination program starting October 1 with the 90% uptake rate and 
50% effectiveness will reduce the peak prevalence only slightly from 5.56% to 5.50% and move 
peak timing by one day earlier (also in Columns 4-7 in Table 2).  When a second upsurge begins 
on September 1, vaccination won’t make any change due to its availability after October.  If 
there is a severe second surge starting in November 1, this same vaccination program will reduce 
the peak prevalence from 5.35% to 3.5% and delay the peak date by one day.   
 
5.    Discussion  
In this section, we discuss our view on which of our forecasted paths are most likely to occur.  
While this exercise is necessarily speculative, we include it because it helps make clear which of 
the various moving parts of our model are most important in reality.  Figures 5 and 6 show the 
epidemic paths from the versions of the model that we believe to be most accurate.  The 
forecasted paths in those figures account for demonstrated vaccine efficacy (Hancock et al. 2009), 
reported vaccine availability (McNeil 2009; McNeil 2009), and the U.S. pandemic situation as of 
October 17, 2009 (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 2009).  
In the U.S., the second pandemic upsurge started in 12 states in early September 2009 and 
spread to 46 states by mid-October (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 2009).  
Therefore, the scenario 7 in Table 1, which forecast no second upsurge, will not occur.  We 
include it partly because there may be other flu variant epidemics in the future where such  
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forecasts are appropriate, and partly because it is a good reference in comparison with the non-
response model in Figure 2 that died out prior a second upsurge in fall 2009.   
The number of people infected by the nH1N1 virus has been increasing since early 
September 2009, exceeding the levels of regular seasonal influenza and the first H1N1 upsurge 
in May 2009 in the U.S.   The number of infected individuals has yet to reach a peak as of 
October 17, 2007, based upon the percentage of visits for influenza-like illness (ILI) at the 
national level (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 2009).  Thus, for the national 
level forecasts, the scenarios forecasting an epidemic peak timing prior to mid-October (such as 
those which assume no avoidance behavior) are not appropriate.   
Based on this reasoning, we identify those scenarios in which effective vaccines are available 
starting in October and in which a second upsurge occurs as most appropriate (Scenarios 1-6 in 
Tables 1 and 2).  Among these scenarios, the forecasts imply: (1) between 33.9% and 57.7% of 
the population ultimately infected with nH1N1 flu; (2) between 51,600 and 87,700 as a result of 
the nH1N1 flu; (3) a peak prevalence between 5.50% and 7.46% of the population;, and (4) a 
peak level of the epidemic occurring between September 21 and October 19, 2009.  The 
forecasted ranges of vaccination benefits were as follows: (1) a reduction in the total population 
ultimately infected between 0.8% and 6.2% of the population; (2) a reduction in total deaths due 
to the vaccine of between 1,300 and 9,500 people; (3) a reduction in the peak prevalence of the 
epidemic of between 0.00% (that is, less than 0.00and 0.16% of the population; and (4) a change 
in peak timing of the epidemic of only 1 day.  
Our forecasts from the scenarios that we identify as most appropriate are qualitatively similar 
to other recent forecasts of the nH1N1 epidemic.  Yang and colleagues estimated the total 
infected cases in the total U.S. population with three levels of pandemic transmissibility: (i) 21- 
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31% (low transmissibility), (ii) 32-39% (moderate) and (iii) 40-49% (high) (Yang et al. 2009). 
The President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology published a scenario in which 
30% to 50% of the population is ultimately infected and there are between 30,000 and 90,000 
deaths (President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology 2009). These death estimates 
are smaller than earlier estimates published by the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, which predicted 90 million infected cases (30% of the U.S. population) and between 
209,000 and 1,903,000 deaths (the latter case assumes that the nH1N1 has characteristics similar 
to the 1918flu virus) (United States Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) 2009).  
The forecasted range of deaths (51,600- 87,700) in our likely scenarios is likely to be 
comparable or greater than all-associated deaths due to seasonal influenza (36,200 with a range 
of 8,097-51,203) (Thompson et al. 2003) and largely overlaps with the recent government report 
(30,000-90,000) (President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology 2009) mentioned 
earlier. 
Deaths due to pandemic nH1N1 are likely to add to, rather substitute for, seasonal influenza 
deaths because the two flu strains affect different populations.  nH1N1 flu is more likely than 
seasonal flu to kill younger people, while around 90% of the influenza-related deaths in the U.S. 
occur among the elderly (Thompson et al. 2003).   
Our estimate of the benefits of vaccination are difficult to compare directly with past studies 
because these studies use different assumptions about vaccination policy (for example, some 
studies assume that two vaccine doses for adults as well as children), priorities in target 
subpopulations, and in vaccine availability (Flahault et al. 2009; Yang et al. 2009).  The 
assumptions we make on these points reflect actual vaccine availability and actual vaccination 
policy.   Yang et al. (2009) estimate only a small benefit from universal vaccination with a 30  
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day delay—a reduction of in the ultimate proportion of the population infected between 10% and 
15% if there is a moderate pandemic, and less than 7% if there is a severe pandemic.   
 
6.  Conclusion  
In our view, the two most important contributions of this paper are: (1) to highlight the 
importance of accounting for avoidance response in SIR models of infectious disease spread, 
when such a response is possible, and (2) to show that vaccination campaigns are most effective 
if they take place before an epidemic has spread.  While these are not new insights (Philipson 
2000; Yoo et al. 2009), they have not been widely understood in the applied literature on disease 
epidemics and to our knowledge have not been applied in the case of the nH1N1 flu epidemic at 
all.  These two results highlight the difficulty that public health officials face in managing an 
infectious disease like the nH1N1 flu.  At the time when vaccination would be most effective, 
demand for the vaccine is lowest because the prevalence of the disease is low.  These results also 
emphasize the importance of avoiding early shortages of vaccines during a flu epidemic. 
We show that it is possible to fit SIR models that take into account of the population’s 
avoidance response to an epidemic using readily available data.  Accounting for this response 
involves a simple modification to a standard SIR model, but results in a substantially better fit to 
the data.  In the case of nH1N1 flu, accounting for avoidance makes particular sense since the 
spread of the flu has led the closure of schools and other costly responses aimed at decreasing the 
spread of infection.  More accurate pandemic path forecast regarding the peak timing and the 
peak level of an epidemic is also particularly useful in aiding public health officials to allocate 
limited resources in a setting where vaccine availability is limited.   
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We find evidence of the importance of accounting for an avoidance response in both the U.S. 
and in Australia.  Our finding that baseline pandemic path and proportion ultimately infected are 
lower because of a robust avoidance response is consistent with common sense, as well as the 
literature on economic epidemiology.  For instance, Yoo et al. (2009) found a robust avoidance 
response in the context of the seasonal flu among a nationally-representative elderly people in 
the U.S. (Yoo et al. 2009).  If the models of other studies (Boelle et al. 2009; Fraser et al. 2009; 
President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology 2009; Yang et al. 2009) also account 
for avoidance response, their forecasts of ultimate epidemic size would likely decrease as they 
did in our forecasts.  
One limitation of our study is that we rely on case report data from the CDC which is 
certainly measured with error (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 2009).  These 
data are known to face biases due to under-reporting and delayed-reporting.  Though it is 
impossible to know how extensive.  To address this limitation, we vary our assumed detection 
rate over a considerable range in our sensitivity analysis.  These sensitivity analyses show that 
several of our most important results (such as the shape of the epidemic paths and our estimates 
on confirmed cases and deaths) are only modestly influenced by such measurement errors.    
A second limitation is that our models do not explicitly account for the effect of antiviral 
medication in reducing the length of infection.  In a sense, we do account for the use of drugs 
such as Tamiflu in our forecasts because we rely on actual case reports of nH1N1 data.  These 
data reflect the effects of antivirals as they are actually used in the population.  Unless the pattern 
of use of antiviral medications has changes between September 2009 and September 2010, which 
appears less likely according a recent CDC report (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention  
  19 
(CDC) 2009), our forecasts of pandemic path and vaccination benefits are unlikely to be affected 
by this limitation.   
A third limitation is that we do not calculate separate forecasts of the effect of the epidemic 
on heterogeneous groups in the population.  This is an important omission because, as we have 
noted, the nH1N1 flu virus affects people of different ages differently.  As the next step in this 
research agenda, we are planning to address this lacuna by incorporating avoidance response into 
agent-based models, which explicitly account for heterogeneous characteristics across 
subpopulations (Longini et al. 2004; Ferguson et al. 2006). 
In part because of avoidance behavior (including the closing of schools and the avoidance by 
individuals of public places at the peak of the epidemic), we expect that the nH1N1 influenza 
pandemic this year to be relatively mild in the U.S. when compared with past pandemics but 
likely to be comparable to or more severe than the typical seasonal influenza epidemic.  To the 
extent that people continue to avoid public places throughout the year due to the nH1N1 
epidemic, the seasonal flu epidemic this year will also be less severe than it might have been.  
However, the fact that avoidance in the face of an epidemic is an important phenomenon makes 
the early availability of vaccines more important not less.  We argue these lessons ought to be 
incorporated into forecasts of future flu epidemics of all sorts.  More accurate and more useful 
forecasts will result and better enable public health officials to make good decisions about the 
allocation of limited funds, anti-virals, vaccines, and other resources such as quarantines and 
school and public event closures to mitigate the impact of future pandemics.   
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Appendix 
Our aim in this paper is to develop and estimate a model of the nH1N1 epidemic that takes 
account of the avoidance response to the spread of the virus.  We rely on the experience of the 
U.S. and Australia in the early stages of the epidemic as our primary data sources.  We estimate 
the parameters of our model using these data and then forecast the implications of our model for 
the future of the epidemic.  In this appendix, we describe our empirical work in some detail. 
 
A.1.   Inferring the Number of Susceptible, Infected, and Recovered from CDC Data  
We construct a microsimulation model of the nH1N1 epidemic with the aim of estimating the 
attack rate of the nH1N1 influenza on each of the 86 days between April 23, 2009 and July 17, 
2009 of our U.S. data.  We forecast the course of the epidemic separately for every state in the 
U.S.  This section explains the microsimulation procedures to estimate the numbers of infectives 
(It), recovered (Rt), susceptibles (St), and the state-specific daily attack rate (βt).  At the end of the 
section, we go through a hypothetical example of our microsimulation exercise to illustrate how 
we estimate the number of infectious cases (It). 
We start with our procedure to estimate the number of infectious cases (It).  Our primary 
data source is the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) which reports the cumulative daily number 
of state-specific laboratory confirmed cases of nH1N1 starting on April 23, 2009.   The CDC 
data correspond to 
dt
dIt  in our notation.  However, since not every case of nH1N1 is laboratory 
confirmed, we need an assumption about the detection rate.  In our base case, we assume a 
detection rate of 5%, which implies that the CDC measures only one in 20 of the actual cases   
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(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 2009).  In sensitivity analyses, we assume a 
10% detection rate, which cuts our forecast in half. 
The CDC data does not indicate the date when an infected individual exited the infective 
compartment, so we need a credible assumption to infer the exit date (i.e., length of stay in the 
infective compartment, or the infectious period) for each case who contracts nH1N1 disease.  
Following past studies (Elveback et al. 1976; Longini et al. 2005), to each person in the CDC 
database we randomly assign the infectious period (τ) as 3 days (with the probability of 0.3), 4 
days (0.4), 5 days (0.2) or 6 days (0.1), which implies that the mean length of infection period is 
4.1 days.  We additionally assume that the infectious period distributions are the same for 
individuals who recover and individuals who die from nH1N1 infection.  Together, these 
assumptions imply that  1 . 4 ) (
1 = +
− γ α .
4
Let 
  We adopt these periods with probabilities, partly 
because data on this parameter for nH1N1 are not available and partly because these values are 
within the range of the CDC’s interim guideline for nH1N1 influenza (Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) 2009).   
} 6 ,..., 3 | { = = k k τ  represent the set of infected patients in the CDC database to whom 
we randomly assign to an infectious period of k  days.  Under our assumptions, the total number 
of infected individuals today equals the sum over all the patients who transitioned into the 
infected compartment over the past six days.  Thus, the total number of infected people on day   
is given by: 



























































                                                 
4 Recall that α  is the case mortality rate and γ  is the case recovery rate.  
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For simplicity, we assume that newly infected individuals had a laboratory test and were 
diagnosed on the first day of their infection.  Therefore, if there was a one-week time-lag 
between the beginning of the infectious period and the laboratory test diagnosis among all 
infected cases, our estimated epidemic paths will reflect an epidemic one week prior.  We 
experimented with altering our assumptions about the length of this time-lag; these experiments 
led us to conclude that this assumption has little effect on the time path and magnitude of the 
forecasted epidemic. 
Next, we describe our procedure for estimating the number of recovered  ) ( t R  and 
susceptible  ) ( t S  individuals.  Among those exiting the infective compartment, we assumed that 
the death rate was a constant 1%.  We base our assumption on case reports of nH1N1 infection 
(Australian Government Department of Health and Ageing 2009; Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC) 2009; President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology 2009).  
We calculate Rt simply as the cumulative number of survivors among the infected as below.   
(A2)  ∫ =
t
x t dx I R
0  
Our calculation of St follows from the definition of N as the population size in any given state.  
N is the sum of four terms: total deaths due to novel influenza infection, St, It, and Rt.  Therefore, 
the number of susceptible people is St = N – It – Rt – (total deaths due to novel influenza infection 
at t).  
Finally, we estimate the state-specific daily infection rate (βt).  Equation (2) from the main 















) ( α γ
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Since we already either directly observe (in the case of  
dt
dIt ) or calculate all of the quantities on 
the right hand side of (A3), we have an estimate of  t β . 
To characterize the uncertainty in this infectious period, we ran 200 iterations. In each 
iteration, we assigned each individual in the CDC database a new draw from the distribution of 
infective periods.  This microsimulation data were generated to match with the real CDC-data in 
terms of the cumulative infectives on the final microsimulation day, July 17, 2009.  For our base 
case of a 5% detection rate, we inflated the number of infected patients (It) (based on the 
confirmed cases) by 20 times by summing 20 iterations of the microsimulation by randomly 
choosing from the 200 iterations already created earlier.  Similarly, for our sensitivity analysis of 
a 10% detection rate, we inflated It by 10 times. 
 
A.2  Example of a microsimulation iteration  
In this section, we illustrate our microsimulation procedure by walking through a single iteration 
in a single hypothetical state.  For simplicity, we assume the CDC detects 100% of all nH1N1 
cases in its data (in the actual simulation, we assume a 5% detection rate).  Table A1 documents 
this example iteration.  In our example, we suppose that one state reports two confirmed cases of 
nH1N1 infection on t = 1 but does not report any additional cases up to t = 7.  On t = 8, the state 
reports a third case to the CDC.  This is indicated on the first on the first row of Table A1.  
For each case that arrives at t = 1, we draw a random number representing the number of 
days that each individual remains infected.  For the first case, represented by the grey boxes on 
the second row of Table A1, we drew 3 days.  For the second case, we drew 4 days.  The total 
number of infected patients in the state on any particular day, equals the number of gray boxes in  
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any given column.  Thus, the number of infected (It) individuals, shown on the fifth row of Table 
A1, is not constant.   1 ; 2 4 3 2 1 = = = = I I I I ; and  0 7 6 5 = = = I I I . 
From the data on row 5, we calculate the number of individuals exiting the infective 
compartment at each t.  These consist of those who recover or die from nH1N1 infection.  In this 
hypothetical example, shown on row 6 of Table A1, one person leaves the infected state at t = 4 
and another leaves at t = 5.  Similarly, we can calculate the number of newly infected 
individuals—two people enter at t = 1 and then no one else enters after.  This is shown on row 7 
of Table A1.  Finally, the change in the number of infected people, or 
dt
dIt , is shown on row 8 of 
Table A1. 
 
A.3.  Estimation of baseline attack rate and avoidance response parameters 
The procedure outlined in Section A.1 and illustrated in Section A.2 generates, for each state and 
at each time point, an enriched state-level data set from the original CDC data which includes the 
key time varying numbers we need to generate estimates of the baseline attack rate and the 
avoidance response parameters.  In this section, we outline our methods for generating these 
latter quantities.  Our primary technology involves estimating a generalized least squares (GLS) 
regression model from the panel of state data outlined in Section A.1 (for each iteration of the 
microsimulation model).  At this point in the discussion, the variation across states becomes 
important since it is needed to identify our parameter estimates, so we subscript our variables and 
parameters with both i (representing each state) and t (representing each time point). 
Our panel data includes the state-specific daily attack rate (βit) and the number of infectious 
people (Iit) for each of 50 states and the 86 days that we observe in our data.  We model βit  as 
follows:  
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(A4)  )) ( exp( 0 0 0 it it I w m t c − = β β  
where  ) ( it I w  is a measure of the cumulative prevalence of nH1N1 disease over the previous 
seven days: 














iT it I I w  
We estimate  0 β ,  0 c , and  0 m  with generalized least squares (GLS) models by applying (A4) 
and (A5)  to our panel data set.  We perform the estimation separately for each of 200 iterations 
of the microsimulation models and also separately for each of the two groups classified based on 
the epidemic activity: one group with ten states with above median incidence and a second group 
of 40 states with below median incidence.  The standard errors we report for the GLS model 
account for heteroskedasticity.  
 
A.4.  Forecasting and validation 
Using our estimates from section A.3 and our microsimulation model—equations (1)-(3), (A4), 
and (A5)—we forecast the “baseline” path of the U.S. pandemic (without vaccination) between 
April 23, 2009 and July 17, 2010.   Among the outputs of our forecast include the cumulative 
numbers of (both total and confirmed) infected cases, deaths, the reproduction rate (RRt) of the 
virus, and the prevalence rate in the total population.  We calculate the time-variant reproductive 
rate (RRt) as the product of three terms: the attack rate, the proportion of susceptibles in the total 













Since we run 200 sets of forecasts (one for each iteration of the microsimulation model) we 
can report representative sets of pandemic path based on the size of the epidemic.  In Figures 1  
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and 2, we report paths that correspond to the median, and the upper and lower 95% percentiles of 
the final extent of the epidemic.  
We also forecast versions of the model in which we assume that there is no avoidance 
response with m0 = 0.  Our purpose in these alternate forecasts is to determine whether forecasts 
produced using our primary avoidance response models fit better with the available data on the 
epidemic (that is, the confirmed cumulative infection rates up to July 17, 2009) than do models 
that ignore an avoidance response.  The results from these comparisons are shown in Figures 1 
and 2. 
In the versions of the model that we report in the paper, we fit our models based on data 
spanning from May 7 to July 3, dropping the first and the last two weeks of the available data.   
Versions of model that do not drop these four weeks yield implausibly small epidemic impacts.  
Besides yielding more plausible results, there is another independent reason to drop these weeks.  
According to the CDC, data from these four weeks were subject to more serious underestimation 
of confirmed cases.  This is because, in the early weeks there were only a limited number of 
laboratory test orders; in the later weeks, the surge in test orders were limited by the limited 
capacities of laboratory testing after the first pandemic upsurge in many states (Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 2009).  This was why CDC stopped collecting and 
releasing the detailed confirmed case numbers after July 17, 2009 (Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC) 2009).  Therefore, our paper presents results based on the U.S. data from 
May 7 to July 3. 
In addition to our U.S. forecasts, we also perform an entirely parallel forecast using data from 
Australia.  The methods we use for our Australian forecasts are exactly analogous to those we 
use in the U.S. forecasts.  However, the Australian confirmed case data are available at the  
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jurisdiction-level (there are 8 jurisdictions in Australia) only up to July 19.   After that date, there 
only data on confirmed cases are available are at the national level.  So for the later period, we 
inferred jurisdiction based on our microsimulation results which allocated the daily newly 
national-level confirmed cases among eight jurisdictions.  Our allocation rule assumes that the 
incidence ratios of the daily newly confirmed cases among eight jurisdictions are equal to those 
of the daily newly hospitalized cases among these jurisdictions. 
 
A.5  Forecasting the benefits of vaccination in the U.S. 
Our analyses shown in Figures 1-3 have been predicated on the assumption that there is no 
effective vaccine available against nH1N1 infection.  As an extension to our work, we modify 
our procedure to take account of the fact that a vaccine did actually become available in the U.S. 
in October, 2009.  Our modified SIR model reflects the most recent information:  in October 1-7 
there were 1 million doses per day of the vaccine, in October 8-14,  6 million doses per day, in 
October 15- December 2, 3 million doses per day.  In total, there were 196 million doses 
available (McNeil 2009; McNeil 2009).   
In this version of our model, we assume that the vaccine uptake rate ranges between 50% and 
90%.  At 50%, we effectively assume that everyday 0.5 million doses (out of 1 million doses 
available) were delivered and effective, and that the remaining 0.5 million doses were left unused 
by the end of a simulation period.  For simplicity and because there are no on point data 
currently available, we assumed vaccine doses to be distributed equally across the all U.S. 
subpopulations.  A 50% uptake rate is plausible because often a large number of doses remain 
unused even during past usual influenza seasons with vaccine supply problems (Orenstein and 
Schaffner 2008).  
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Let p be the uptake rate of the vaccine.  We randomly select p percent of the individuals from 
the susceptible (S) and the recovered (R) compartments of the SIR model to receive the vaccine.  
We select people from R because in reality only a small proportion of the recovered population 
has a laboratory confirmed diagnosis of nH1N1.  We assume, therefore, that all subjects in R 
wants to be vaccinated, which approximates the actual U.S. situation.  (This assumption reduces 
the effectiveness of the vaccine because providing the vaccine to people in R does not contribute 
mitigating the pandemic.  These individuals have presumably already gained natural immunity to 
nH1N1 infection which we assume to be 100% protective against H1N1 infection.)   
Following the most recent vaccination guideline (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) 2009), adults receive only one dose and children aged under 10 receive two doses 
separated by 28 days (second dose contained half the amount of the first dose).  We account for 
this recommendation as well in our model.  
We assume vaccination is 30%-70% effective in reducing infection, severe illness, and death 
due to novel influenza.  We incorporated this assumption into our model as follows.   Suppose 
vaccine effectiveness is 50%.  In that case, only 50% of the vaccinated individuals transit 
directly from the susceptible (S) compartment directly into R without passing through the 
infected (I) compartment.  The remaining 50% of these vaccinated individuals (with poor 
immune-response) remain in S despite vaccination.  We assume that, these vaccinated with a 
poor immune-response were not vaccinated more than once, since individuals do not typically 
know their immune-response to a vaccine that requires a laboratory test.  
The vaccine becomes protective roughly 9 days after it is administered.  In the case of 
children under 10, it becomes effective only after the second dose  (Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC) 2009).   We modeled this fact as follows:  all of the vaccinated remain in  
  29 
the susceptible compartment for 9 days after the vaccination date, except for children under 10 
who remain in S for 37 days after the first vaccination.   
Formally, let µ  indicate vaccine uptake rate (ranging between 50% and 90%), let   indicate 
the proportion of population aged 10 or older, let θ  indicate vaccine effectiveness (ranging 
between 30% and 70%), and let  t V  indicate the total number of vaccine doses available on day t.   
When we incorporate the assumptions about vaccination into our modified SIR model, equations 
(1)-(3) become: 
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Table 1. Forecasted novel H1N1 influenza pandemic total impacts and vaccination benefit 
measured by [final size and total deaths] in the United States from April 23, 2009 to September 5, 
2010 (day 500) 
scenario 
Second 





















  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6]  [7] 
1  Sep.1  n/a  n/a  57.7  87,686  n/a  n/a 
2  Oct.1  n/a  n/a  40.1  61,030  n/a  n/a 
3  Sep.1  50%  50%  57.2  86,922  0.50  763 
4  Oct.1  50%  50%  36.3  55,144  3.87  5,886 
5  Sep.1  50%  90%  56.8  86,407  0.84  1,279 
6  Oct.1  50%  90%  33.9  51,555  6.23  9,475 
7  None  n/a  n/a  46.2  70,186  n/a  n/a 
†: Second upsurge: At the onset of a second upsurge, the illness attack rate increased to 0.68 in upsurge 
scenarios.  These illness attack rates (0.68) were estimated with the past Australian “winter” data from 
April to September 2009, detailed in the text.  Scenario 7 did not assume a second upsurge or use these 
Australian winter parameters. 
‡: Vaccination effectiveness in reducing infection, severe illness and death due to novel influenza.  
Vaccine uptake rate among the available vaccine doses (October 1-7: 1 million doses per day; October 8-
14: 6 million doses per day; October 15- December 2 (7 weeks): 3 million doses per day; 196 million 
doses in total) 
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Table 2. Forecasted H1N1 novel influenza pandemic peak and vaccination benefit measured by 
[peak prevalence rate and peak timing] in the United States from April 23, 2009 to September 5, 
























  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6]  [7] 
1  Sep.1  n/a  n/a  7.46%  09/21/09  n/a  n/a 
2  Oct.1  n/a  n/a  5.66%  10/19/09  n/a  n/a 
3  Sep.1  50%  50%  7.46%  09/21/09  0.00%  0 
4  Oct.1  50%  50%  5.56%  10/19/09  0.10%  0 
5  Sep.1  50%  90%  7.46%  09/21/09  0.00%  0 
6  Oct.1  50%  90%  5.50%  10/18/09  0.16%  1 
7  None  n/a  n/a  1.00%  02/13/10  n/a  n/a 
†: Second upsurge: At the onset of a second upsurge, the illness attack rate increased to 0.68 in upsurge 
scenarios.  These illness attack rates (0.68) were estimated with the past Australian “winter” data from 
April to September 2009, detailed in the text.  Scenario 7 did not assume a second upsurge or use these 
Australian winter parameters. 
‡: Vaccination effectiveness in reducing infection, severe illness and death due to novel influenza.  
Vaccine uptake rate among the available vaccine doses (October 1-7: 1 million doses per day; October 8-
14: 6 million doses per day; October 15- December 2 (7 weeks): 3 million doses per day; 196 million 
doses in total) 
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Table A1. Hypothetical example of microsimulation to estimate the number of infectives (It) 
 
    t=1  t=2  t=3  t=4  t=5  t=6  t=7 
[1]  CDC report (cumulative cases)  2  2  2  2  2  2  2 
[2]  Infected case 1§               
[3]  Infected case 2§               
[4]  Infected case 3§               
[5]  Number of infectives: It†   2  2  2  1  0  0  0 
[6]  Number of individuals exiting 
the infective compartment ‡  0  0  0  1  1  0  0 
[7]  Number of newly infected 
individuals  2  0  0  0  0  0  0 
[8]  Change in number of 
infectives from t-1 to t: dIt /dt  2  0  0  -1  -1  0  0 
§: Shaded cells indicate the infectious period for each infected case. 
†: It counts the number of shaded cells for each column t. 
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Figure 1. Cumulative confirmed novel H1N1 influenza infected cases in the United States from April 23 to August 31, 2009 (day 86): 
Real data (up to July 17, 2009) and forecasts by primary avoidance response model and secondary non-response model (95% CI of 
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(median of 50 states)
 
CI represents confidence interval; Non-response model assumed there was no avoidance response. ; Non-response model assumed 
illness attack rates are 0.343 and .418, which are estimated by the microsimulation among 10 states and 40 states respectively, detailed 
in the text. Extended forecasts of epidemic paths up to September 2010 of these models are presented in Figure 2 in a different unit 
[proportion of cumulative infected among total population (%)] 
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Figure 2. Forecasted novel H1N1 influenza pandemic path measured by [proportion of cumulative infected among total population 
(%)] in the United States from April 23, 2009 to September 5, 2010 (day 500): 3 scenarios with different assumptions. (95% CI: 
dashed lines) 
CI represents confidence interval; Non-response model assumed there was no avoidance response; At the onset of a second upsurge, the 
illness attack rate increased to 0.68.  These illness attack rate (0.68) was estimated with the past Australian “winter” data from April to September 
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Figure 3. Forecasted novel H1N1 influenza pandemic path with conservative assumptions about vaccination programs (50% 
effectiveness and 50% uptake level) measured by [proportion of cumulative infected among total population (%)] in the United States 































































































(Oct. 1 onset second
upsurge; Vaccination 50%
effective; 50% coverage)
Non-response model assumed there was no avoidance response; At the onset of a second upsurge, the illness attack rate increased to 0.68.  
These illness attack rate (0.68) was estimated with the past Australian “winter” data from April to September 2009, detailed in the text. 
Vaccination 50% effective in reducing infection, severe illness and death due to novel influenza.  Vaccine coverage rate among the available 
vaccine doses (October 1-7: 1 million doses per day; October 8-14: 6 million doses per day; October 15- December 2 (7 weeks): 3 million doses 
per day; 196 million doses in total).  
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Figure 4. Forecasted novel H1N1 influenza pandemic path with conservative assumptions about vaccination programs (50% 
effectiveness and 50% uptake level) measured by [proportion of cumulative infected (%)] in the United States from April 23, 2009 to 



















































































(Sep. 1 onset second upsurge;
Vaccination 50% effective; 50%
coverage)
Avoidance response model
(Sep. 1 onset second upsurge;
Vaccination 50% effective; 90%
coverage)
Avoidance response model
(Oct. 1 onset second upsurge;
Vaccination 50% effective; 50%
coverage)
Avoidance response model
(Oct. 1 onset second upsurge;
Vaccination 50% effective; 90%
coverage)
At the onset of a second upsurge, the illness attack rate increased to 0.68.  These illness attack rate (0.68) was estimated with the past Australian 
“winter” data from April to September 2009, detailed in the text. Vaccination is 50% effective in reducing infection, severe illness and death due 
to novel influenza.  Vaccine coverage rate among the available vaccine doses (October 1-7: 1 million doses per day; October 8-14: 6 million doses 
per day; October 15- December 2 (7 weeks): 3 million doses per day; 196 million doses in total).  
  39 
Figure 5. Forecasted vaccination benefit in changing the novel H1N1 influenza pandemic peak [prevalence rate (%) and timing] in the 

































































































(Oct. 1 onset second
upsurge; Vaccination 50%
effective; 90% coverage)
At the onset of a second upsurge, the illness attack rate increased to 0.68.  These illness attack rate (0.68) was estimated with the past Australian 
“winter” data from April to September 2009, detailed in the text. Vaccination is 50%effective in reducing infection, severe illness and death due to 
novel influenza.  Vaccine coverage rate among the available vaccine doses (October 1-7: 1 million doses per day; October 8-14: 6 million doses 
per day; October 15- December 2 (7 weeks): 3 million doses per day; 196 million doses in total) 